My research is largely driven by questions concerning how we form representations of the world around us, with my primary interest being inaccurate representations of reality.
Much of my work has centered on unusual or atypical types of mental states, such as delusions and conspiracy theories. I’ve also examined attitudes that are more common, yet still seem to be at odds with prototypical beliefs, such as religious convictions and moral beliefs. I also have a significant interest in the imagination—especially the epistemic roles of imagination (e.g., how does imagination shape our understanding of reality? When does it enhance our knowledge, and when does it lead us astray?).
My dissertation (in progress) brings these threads together by examining the roles of imagination in shaping our conceptions of reality, with specific application to delusions.
In my MA thesis, “Delusions as Hetero-dynamic Property Clusters” (advised by Neil Van Leeuwen), I address the debate concerning which attitude best characterizes delusions. In the paper, I attempt to advance the debate by putting forward a new descriptive model for characterizing delusions. You can read more about the paper here. If you’re so inclined, you can download it here.
Works in Progress
Delusions and Reality Constraints
Abstract: To address the peculiar epistemic features of delusions, several philosophers have suggested that delusions are not beliefs, but imaginings. This dispute over the type of attitude constitutive of delusions is motivated by the presumptions that (i) belief and imagining play distinct epistemic roles, and (ii) that the peculiar features of delusions can be explained in virtue of their being either beliefs or imaginings. In this paper, I call both presumptions into question by homing in on a particular mechanism of belief that some imaginings also share—namely, reality constraints. Afterwards, I propose that a contributing factor of delusions is a malfunction in one’s ability to impose reality constraints.
Draft available
A Wittgensteinian Approach to Delineating Delusions
Abstract: In this paper I examine the proposal that delusions can be understood in terms of Wittgenstein’s conception of framework propositions. Despite their initial persuasiveness, I argue that such accounts are incomplete in that they cannot help us adequately distinguish delusions from other ostensibly similar states (e.g., religious beliefs and conspiracy theory beliefs). Accordingly, my aim is to supplement framework proposition accounts by drawing attention to how Wittgenstein’s conception of language games can provide us with a positive story about delusions—one which sets them apart from similar states.
Draft available
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